After multiple rounds of negotiations between Russia and the US, Russia and Ukraine began direct talks in May. These have led to prisoner exchanges so far, not a ceasefire. Despite Trump’s commitment to bringing about a definitive resolution to the conflict, the chances in the near future aren’t very high. A fundamental contradiction persists in how each side perceives its core security interests. Europe, on the other hand, has reiterated its commitment to defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and subsequently enlarged its military budget.
In the recent talks in June, Ukraine and Russia submitted a memorandum of their demands. Moscow’s demands remain unchanged. It is calling for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the regions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk, and wants the recognition of the territory of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Further, Russia demands Ukraine’s neutrality — that it gives up its claims to joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and maintains a limited armed force. Other demands included the lifting of martial law and elections in Ukraine within 100 days after an end to the conflict. Ukraine, on the other hand, cites its membership in NATO and the European Union as central for its security guarantees. It also seeks the frozen Russian assets to be used as reparations. In the past, both sides have vehemently rejected these demands, citing them as a non-starter in the talks.
In an abandoned 2022 draft deal, one condition laid out was that Ukraine would maintain neutrality in return for security guarantees from five permanent members of the United Nations, as well as other countries like Belarus, Germany, Turkey, Israel, Poland, and Canada. The talks failed. Three years on, while the framework of the deal has remained the same, Ukraine’s negotiating heft has considerably reduced, despite the conclusion of the US–Ukraine critical minerals agreement, giving the US privileged access to Ukraine’s mineral extraction. With Russia regaining territory in the Kursk region, its forces have now entered Sumy, with the plan of creating a buffer zone. Ukraine, in response, has launched a salvo of drone attacks on Russia on critical infrastructure to slow down its advance.
The Russian delegation not pulling out of the talks after the biggest Ukrainian drone attack of the war (Operation Spider’s Web) on 1 June reflects a degree of pragmatism on Moscow’s part. Both sides are aware of the complexity of bringing the conflict to an end. For Russia, seeking the neutrality of Ukraine remains its primary interest, and its demands for territory secondary. Sanctions relief also comes under secondary interests. Ukraine, on the other hand, sees security guarantees as the most important, and the status of territories on the right bank of the Dnipro River as secondary. Moscow controls more than 75 per cent of the territories of Donetsk and Kherson, and more than 90 per cent of Luhansk.
Apart from reaching an agreement on these territorial and security factors, other concerns remain with respect to how both sides plan to administer a ceasefire, as it would require a huge number of troops to secure the demilitarised zone. Then there is the issue of funding such a force. One reason for Moscow’s reticence in pushing for a ceasefire stems from the fear that Ukraine will regroup and launch a counterattack. Thus, both sides are aiming to build trust, which can be reflected in their stepping up efforts to release an equal number of POWs.
Both sides are aware that bringing an end to the hostilities will take place in a piecemeal fashion, with long-drawn negotiations and the prospects of further escalation. History shows us how, in the Vietnam War, the US and the erstwhile North Vietnam began negotiations in the summer of 1968, and the conclusion of the peace accord took more than five years to culminate in 1973. If Ukraine capitulates, it will be a significant blow to NATO allies, as Russia’s dominance can alter the European security architecture. Thus, with both Russian and Ukrainian positions being divergent, with Europe backing Ukraine, and with earlier attempts in resolving the conflict across the span of 11 years failing (Minsk and Istanbul), it is unlikely that peace will return anytime soon.
The writer is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation
